

VII - VI
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(Revised)

Exh. No.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: OKADA, Keisuke



Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I, OKADA, Keisuke, make oath and say as follows:

1. I, OKADA, Keisuke, was appointed Admiral in 1924 and placed on the reserve list in January, 1933. I was appointed Prime Minister in July, 1934, from which post I resigned in March, 1936 when the Cabinet resigned en bloc. I have since participated in meetings of Senior Statesmen as one of them in the capacity of ex-Premier.
2. Following the resignation of the Third KONOYE Cabinet on 11 October, 1941, a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held at 1:10 P.M., October 17, 1941. I attended the meetings from beginning to end. I have carefully read the record of the said meeting, which was shown to me, the original of which record is on file in the Inner Court Document Section Board of Chamberlain which is being incorporated in Marquis KIDO's statement, and find that the main points of the statements of the conferees at the meetings are accurately mentioned in the record to the best of my recollection. At the said meeting, Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, when asked his opinion stated that he thought War Minister TOJO would be suitable for a succeeding Prime Minister. The Marquis gave the reason for his recommendation of War Minister TOJO as follows:

First - the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6; that is, the decision to go to war should be reviewed as it was made without careful consideration.

Second - as the result of frank talks with War Minister TOJO, it is ascertained that the General thinks it will be impossible to wage war with America on the part of the Army if the Navy really openly opposed hostilities.

Third - War Minister TOJO, as member of the KONOYE Cabinet, is fully acquainted with the developments of the home and foreign situation. If the Emperor commands him to draw the Army into closer cooperation with the Navy and review the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 in ordering him to form a succeeding Cabinet, the situation will be able to be saved by him.

The object of Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, therefore in recommending General TOJO consisted in averting war with America as was clearly discerned from his statements at the conference. In view of the Army's stiff attitude, I felt skeptical if the object of General TOJO's recommendation, that is, averting of war with America would be fulfilled. Therefore, I asked Marquis KIDO about that point. In reply, the Marquis stated to the effect that the object would be attained, as the Navy was opposed to war.

3. At the said meeting, Baron WAKATSUKI mentioned the name of General UGAKI, though he apprehended Army opposition to the General. Whereupon, General ABE expressed his view that it would prove impossible for General UGAKI to form a succeeding Cabinet, due to Army opposition. Marquis KIDO said that General UGAKI was a No. 1 statesman so far as his abilities were concerned, and as such, he was certainly one of the strongest candidates for a succeeding Prime Minister but expressed fears that it might be extremely difficult for the General to curb and control an Army which was bent on going on the war path, contrary to the national policies to avert war. He also pointed out the fact that General UGAKI failed to form a new Cabinet some time ago due to Army opposition.

and that report had it that the Army's anti-UGAKI fever had not yet abated. I felt that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, true to his responsibility, might well hesitate to recommend to the Throne a statesman who might probably fail again in attempts to form a succeeding Cabinet and have to decline the Imperial offer again.

4. I expressed my view at the meeting to the effect that General UGAKI would do, if only it was all right with the Army, it is true; but it was not a positive view that I recommended General UGAKI. When Marquis KIDO asked me to make sure, therefore, I replied that I did not mean that General UGAKI should be recommended by all means. I have never heard from naval circles or from any other quarters that Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, counselled the Emperor in ordering General TOJO to form a succeeding Cabinet to instruct the Navy to recommend a Navy Minister who would obey General TOJO's commands to go to war. If he had said such a thing I would have heard it.
5. On the morning of Nov. 29, 1941 I attended the meeting of the Senior Statesmen, TOJO, and other members of the Cabinet. Neither the Emperor nor Marquis KIDO were present. After luncheon with the Emperor, the Senior Statesmen and TOJO had a meeting in the presence of the Emperor. TOJO said very little, the meeting being devoted to the Senior Statesmen expressing their opinions to the Emperor. Marquis KIDO was present in waiting on the Emperor, but said nothing at the audience. No decisions were made. After that meeting, the Senior Statesmen, TOJO, and other members of the Cabinet reconvened the meeting which had recessed in the morning. Neither the Emperor nor Marquis KIDO attended this meeting.
6. Before the end of the TOJO Cabinet, I thought it necessary to have one who would identify himself with restoration of peace by the termination of hostilities join the Cabinet as a Minister of State. I broached my idea to Baron WAKATSUKI, Prince KONOYE,

Baron HIRANUMA and Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and obtained their approval. To attain this, I made endeavors to have Admiral YONAI reinstated in active service and appointed Navy Minister to succeed Admiral SHIMADA, then Navy Minister and concurrently Chief of Staff of the Navy, and spoke to many people to accomplish this but in vain.

7. Following the resignation of the TOJO Cabinet en bloc, a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held at 4:00 P.M., July 18, 1944, rising at 8:45 P.M. I attended the meeting from beginning to end. I have carefully read a record of the said meeting which was shown to me, Pros. Exh. 1278, and find that according to my best recollection the main points of the statements of the conferees at the meeting are accurately mentioned in the record.

8. At this meeting a complete agreement of views was reached by all the Senior Statesmen to the principle that an Army or Navy man in active service would be suitable for a succeeding Prime Minister in view of the necessity for closer cooperation between the Government and the High Command which was called for by the fact that Japan was in the midst of war. Several candidates were discussed under this principle, but finally it was agreed that Marshal TERAUCHI be chosen as first candidate, General KOISO as second candidate, Marshal HATA as third candidate, and Admiral YONAI as fourth candidate. As the result of which, General KOISO and Admiral YONAI were commanded by the Emperor to form a succeeding Cabinet jointly. On that occasion, Admiral YONAI was reinstated in active service as an act of grace from the Throne and appointed Minister of the Navy. Thus my efforts and that of others were finally successful.

9. As the record of said meeting shows, Baron WAKATSUKI made a statement which might be interpreted as meaning his recommendation of General UGAKI as succeeding Prime Minister; but General ABE and Baron HIRANUMA made brief statements which might be interpreted as meaning their disapproval of his suggestion, and no other

conferees supported General UGAKI. Baron WAKATSUKI's proposal was not endorsed by the meeting to all intents and purposes. And later the Baron himself stated that he had no objection to General KOISO's recommendation as succeeding Prime Minister.

10. Following the resignation of the KOISO Cabinet en bloc, a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held at 5:00 P.M., April 5, 1945 to select a succeeding Prime Minister and rose at 8:00 P.M. I attended the meeting from beginning to end. I have carefully read a record of the said meeting which was shown to me - Pros. Ex. 1282 - and find that to my best recollection the main points of the statements of the conferees at the meeting are accurately mentioned in the record.
11. When the SUZUKI Cabinet was formed on April 5, 1945 I worked hard and talked with many people. I did my best to have Admiral YONAI and Mr. TOGO join the Cabinet as Minister of the Navy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, respectively, for the purpose of restoring peace by terminating hostilities, and they did assume these posts. Sometime in April 1944, Marquis KIDO and I had an extremely confidential talk about termination of the war. The very nature of this subject required extreme caution on our parts. His ideas and mine coincided that efforts should be made to end the hostilities as quickly as possible, but that we would have to wait for an opportune moment as it was not a matter which could be forced. I had previously discussed this matter with Marquis MATSUDAIRA and asked him to transmit my thoughts to Marquis KIDO. I had many talks with Marquis KIDO thereafter about early termination of the war. His efforts in this direction have been recorded elsewhere, so I shall not repeat them here except to congratulate him for the success of his heroic services.

On this 22nd day of February, 1947

At Wakabayashi 105, Setagayaku, Tokyo

Deponent: OKADA, Keisuke (seal)

I, FUKUDA, Kou hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) FUKUDA, Kou (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(signed) OKADA, Keisuke (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供神書

供述者

岡

田

啓

介

自分機内ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

余、岡田啓介ハ宣誓ノ上左ノ通り陳述ス。

一、余、岡田啓介ハ一九二四年（大正十三年）海軍大尉ニ親任セラレ、一九三三年（昭和八年）一月豫備役編入、一九三四年（昭和九年）七月内閣總理大臣トナリ、一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月内閣總理職ニ依リ退官シ、爾來前首相ノ資格ヲ以テ重臣トシテ重臣會議ニ参加シタリ。

二、第二次近衛内閣ガ總辭職シタル際、及總首相決定ノ爲ニ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十七日午後一時十分ヨリ重臣會議ガ開催セラレ、余ハ之ニ終始出席シタリ。

余ハ余ニ示サレタル右會議記錄ヲ精讀シタリ。該記錄ノ原本ハ侍從職内書記部ニ保存シアリタルモノナリ。當日ノ會議ニ於ケル各人ノ發言ノ趣旨ハ、余ノ記憶セル通り正確ニ記載セラレアリタリ。

右會議ニ於テ木戸内大臣ハ、内大臣ノ意見ヲ聞ハレシ際、後總内閣首相ニハ東條陸相ガ適當ト考フル旨ヲ述べ推薦、其ノ理由トシテ第一ニ、九月六日ノ御前會議ノ決定即開戦決定ハ忽卒ノ間ニ決定セラレテ不充分ナルコト、第二ニ東條陸相ト打割リタル話ヲ遂メタル處ニ依レバ、陸軍ト雖、海軍ガ公式ニ反對スルヲバ日米戦争ヲ敢行スルコトハ不可能ト考ヘ得ルコト、第三ニ東條ハ近衛内閣ノ首相トシテ内外ノ事態ノ經濟ヲ充分ニ知悉シテ居リ、組閣ノ大命降下ニ際シ陛下ヨリ海陸軍ノ協議

ト、九月六日ノ御前會議ノ決定ノ再檢討トテ御命ジニナレバ、東條大將ニヨリテ時局ヲ收拾シ得ベキコト等ヲ説明シタリ。依ツテ木戸内府ノ東條推薦ノ目的ガ日米交渉回避ニ在ルコトハ、其ノ會議ノ席上ノ談話ニヨリ明白ニ看取セラレタリ。

余ハ陸軍ノ強硬態度ニ鑑ミ東條大將ガ示シテ推薦ノ目的、即戦争回避ヲ實現シ得ルヲ氣遣ヒテ此點ヲ木戸内府ニ質シタル處、内府ハ海軍ガ戦争ニ

三

反對スルコトニヨリ目的ヲ達シ得ベシトノ意味ヲ述ベラレタリ。

、右會議ノ席上、若槻男ハ陸軍ノ反對ヲ默念シテラ宇垣大將ノ名ヲ擧ケラレタル處、阿部陸軍大將ハ陸軍ノ反對ニ對ヒテ宇垣陸軍大將ハ組閣不能

ニ陷ルベシトノ意味ノ意見ヲ述ベタリ。木戸内大臣ハ宇垣陸軍大將ハ力量

ニ於テハ當代ノ第一人者ニシテ有力ナル首相候補トハ考フルモ、以前ニ陸

軍ノ反對ニ依リ組閣ニ失敗シ、現在モ情狀ニ依レバ陸軍ノ反宇垣熱ハ未ダ

解消セズ。未ニ戦争回避ト國策ヲ決定シテ戦争ヲ欲スル陸軍ヲ制壓、統制

スルガ如キコトハ極メテ困難ナルベシト述べ、内大臣ノ責任上再ビ組閣ニ

失敗シテ一旦御受シタル大命ヲ復モヤ拜辭スル虞アル者ヲ陛下ニ奏請スル

コトヲ躊躇スルハ尤モナル次第ナリト感じタリ。

、右會議ノ席上、余ハ陸軍サヘ治マルナラバ宇垣陸軍大將ニテモ可ナリト

意味ノ意見ハ述ベタレドモ、宇垣陸軍大將ヲ推薦スルト云フ積極的意見

ニハ非ズ。故ニ内大臣ノ確カメノ質問ニ對シ、固イテ宇垣大將ヲ云フニ非ザル旨ヲ答ヘタリ。

東條内閣ノ組閣ニ際シ木戸内大臣ガ陛下ニ對シ、東條ガ開戦ト決定シタ場合ニ東條ノ命令ニ違フ様ナ海軍大臣ヲ出ス様ニ海軍ニ御命ジ被遊度ト進言シタリト云フガ如キコトハ、余ハ海軍方面其他如何ナル方面ヨリモ何等開知シタルコトナシ、假リニ内大臣ガ斯クノ如キ事ヲ云ハレタトスルナラバ、余ハ之ニ就テ聞キ及ブベキデアラウ。

五、昭和十六年十一月二十九日朝、余ハ軍部ト東條及他ノ閣僚トノ會合ニ出席セリ。陛下及ビ木戸侯ハ出席セザリキ。御陪食ノ後軍部及ビ東條氏ハ陛下ノ御前ニテ會合ヲナシタリ。東條氏ハ殆ド語ラズ。其ノ會合ハ陛下ニ軍部ガ各自ノ意見ヲ奏上スルニアリタリ。木戸侯ハ陛下ニ扈從シテ出席シアリタルモ、御前ニテ何等ノ發言ハナカリシ。實際ニハ何ノ決定モ行ハレザリキ。

其ノ會合ノ後軍部ト東條及ビ他ノ閣僚トノ會合ガ午前ニ引キ續キ再開サレタルモ、陛下及ビ木戸侯ハソレニハ出席セザリキ。

六、東條内閣ノ末期ニ余ハ内閣ニ及爭終結ニ努力スル人ヲ入レル必要アリト考ヘ、之ヲ若槻男、近衛公、平沼男及木戸内大臣ニ説キテ贊成ヲ得、ソレ

迄ニハ余ハ島田海相兼軍令部總長ノ兼務ヲ解キテ米内海軍大將ヲ現役ニ復
シテ海相トナスベク工作シ、之ヲ達成スベク多クノ人々ニ語リタルモ果サ
ザリキ。

七、東條内閣が組織シタル際、後首相選定ノ爲ニ一九四四年（昭和十九年）七月十八日午後四時重臣會議が開催セラレ、午後八時四十五分散會、余ハ終始之ニ出席シタリ。

余ハ余ニ示サレタル檢察側法廷證一二七八ノ右會議記錄ヲ精讀シタリ。當日ノ會議ニ於ケル各人ノ發言ノ趣旨ハ余ノ明カナル記憶ニヨレバ正確ニ記載シ居レリ。

八、當時ハ戰爭ノ眞最中ナリシヲ以テ、國務ト統帥ノ緊密ナル連絡ノ必要上現役ノ陸軍又ハ海軍軍人ヲ適當トストノ原則ニハ重臣全員ノ意見一致シ、此ノ原則ノ下ニ數名ノ候補者ガ討論セラレタルガ第一候補者寺内元帥、第二候補者小磯陸軍大將、第三候補者米内ノ順序ニ落付キタリ。其ノ結果ハ小磯、米内兩氏ニ大命ノ降下トナリ殊ニ米内大將ハ現役ニ列シ海軍大臣ニ親補セラレタリ。

九、斯ク余等ノ努力ハ遂ニ成功シタルナリ。

右會議記錄ノ示ス如ク、若槻男ハ例ノ如ク宇垣陸軍大將推薦ノ意味ノ發言セラレタルモ、阿部陸軍大將及平沼男ガ不贊成ノ意味ニ解セラルル簡單ナル發言ヲナシタル外、一人モ宇垣大將ニ贊成ノ發言ナク、若槻男ノ提議ハ贊成セラレザル如キ形ナリキ。

若槻男モ後ニハ小磯陸軍大將ニ異存ナキ旨ヲ述ベラレタリ。

十、小磯内閣が總辭職シタル際、後繼首相選定ノ爲一九四五年（昭和二十年）四月五日午後五時重臣會議が開催セラレ、午後八時散會余ハ之ニ終始出席シタリ。

余ハ余ニ示サレタル檢察側法廷證一二八二ヲ精讀シタリ。當日ノ會議ニ於ケル各人ノ發言ノ趣旨ハ余ノ記憶通りニシテ此記錄ニ正確ニ記載セル所ナリ。

十一、昭和二十年（一九四五年）四月五日鈴木内閣ノ成立セル際ニ終戰ニ導ク爲ニ同内閣ニ海相トシテ米内、外相トシテ東郷ヲ入レルコトニ盡力シ多クノ人ト話シ合ヒタリ。而シテ是等兩氏ハ海相ト外相ニ就任シタリ。木戸大臣が戰爭ノ速カナル終結ヲ念願シ、早クヨリ之ニ努力シタル功績ハ極メテ顯著ナリ。一九四四年四月頃木戸侯ト余ハ極秘裡ニ戰爭終結ニ就テ語り合ヒタリ。此目的ノ性質上吾々ノ立場デハ非常ナル用心ヲ必要トシタリ。侯ト余ノ意見ハ出來ルダケ早ク戰爭ヲ終結スルト云フ點デ一致シ居リタルモ、之ハ強行スベキ間口デハナク、適當ナル機會ヲ待タネバナラヌト考ヘタリ。余ハ豫テ松平侯ト此間口ヲ討議シ、又余ノ考ヘチ木戸侯ニ傳ヘルベク依頼セリ。其後余ハ木戸侯ト戰爭ノ早期終結ニ付屬々語り合ヒタリ。此ノ方面ニ於ケル侯ノ努力ニツキテハ他デ述べラレテアル故余ハ余ガ侯ノ英雄的の努力ノ成功ヲ祝スルコトヲ除キテハ此所ニ繰リ返スコトヲ欲セズ。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月二十一日 於

東京都世田谷區右林 一〇五

供 述 者 岡 田 啓 介

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルニトテ證明シマス

同日 於 同 所

立 會 人 岡 田 耕

署名捺印

岡田啓介

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皇心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ默秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

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